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ABSTRACT 
Impact bag inflators contain energetic components that have finite lives as either a function of age or 
environment, or a combination of both. Because of their application these inflators are required to operate safely 
and at very high levels of reliability, in many cases after significant periods of storage and installation, and often 
in less than benign environments. Historically, there has been limited data available that provided assurance of 
the ongoing technical integrity of inflators through life leading to, at best, the tacit acceptance of higher levels of 
risk associated with the continued operation of these items. At worst, there is the possibility of unsafe operation 
of inflators. 
This paper proposes an ongoing program that builds on existing initial design certification and production 
acceptance test activities by conducting performance monitoring activities (termed surveillance activities) on 
items that have experienced both typical and more severe environments over their expected design life. This 
program has its basis in Configuration Management (CM), which provides a sound engineering framework for 
determining the safety status and performance of inflators. The program mitigates many of the asset management 
risks, is cost effective, easily targeted at inflators that have experienced more extreme environments and, as a 
continuous operation, provides ongoing confidence in the safety and performance of inflators. 
INTRODUCTION 
Impact bag inflators contain energetic components 
that have finite lives as either a function of age or 
environment, or a combination of both. Because of 
their application these inflators are required to 
operate safely and at very high levels of reliability, 
in many cases after significant periods of storage 
and installation, and often in less than benign 
environments. Being one-shot or single use devices 
these items cannot be tested and, if found 
serviceable, reinstalled into the vehicle safety 
system.  
Historically, there has been limited data available 
that provided assurance to manufacturers (that is, 
the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM)), 
higher assembly vehicle manufacturers (or vehicle 
OEMs) and regulating authorities of the ongoing 
technical integrity of inflators through-life leading 
to, at best, the tacit acceptance of higher levels of 
risk associated with the continued operation of 
these items. At worst, the degradation of these 
energetic components can have, and has been 
shown to have, catastrophic effects on performance 
[1]. 
One mitigation strategy to prevent the use of 
unacceptably degraded inflators, the associated loss 
of confidence in the technical integrity of inflators 
generally, and the significant costs associated with 
vehicle recall activities, is to adopt a rigorous 
configuration management strategy that includes, 
among other aspects, an audit program whose 
results provide necessary assurance to OEMs and 
regulating authorities of the ongoing safety and 
performance of inflators. Such a program is, 
typically, part of a larger multi-stage test program. 
OBJECTIVE 
This paper provides background on the requirement 
for through-life monitoring of the performance of 
inflators, the engineering framework within which 
such monitoring could occur, and an outline of the 
type of activities that should be considered as part 
of a safety and performance monitoring program. 
Specifically, this paper will: 
a. discuss the characteristics of inflators which, 
because of their design, require specific 
asset management strategies, including 
performance monitoring; 
b. define the term technical integrity; 
c. explain the elements and advantages of 
adopting a configuration management 
framework to assure the technical integrity 
of inflators; and 
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d. outline an audit program for inflators. 
Note that this paper is not a review of USCAR24-2 
Inflator Technical Requirements and Validation [2], 
and assumes that the standard adequately addresses 
initial design certification and production 
acceptance requirements for inflators. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF INFLATORS 
Impact bag inflators contain energetic materials 
which have been found to degrade with both time 
and as a function of the environment to which the 
item is exposed [1]. Consequently, these items have 
a finite life (currently 15 years [2]1) during which 
their performance would be expected to meet the 
requirements of the item’s Function and 
Performance Specification (FPS)2. 
Because these items contain energetic materials and 
are required to operate in a Safety Critical System 
(SCS)3, the items have a number of common 
characteristics that distinguish them from nearly all 
other vehicle safety components. That is, the items: 
a. in most cases, are never required to operate 
and hence may only be replaced during 
scheduled maintenance activities or removed 
from the vehicle at the end of the vehicle’s 
life; 
b. are not repairable; 
c. may be stored for long periods of time prior 
to installation in the vehicle; 
d. may be installed for long periods of time 
within the vehicle, potentially experiencing 
extremes of environments; 
e. are not subjected to any maintenance 
activity; 
f. if they are required to operate, and because 
of the criticality of SCSs, the FPS requires 
the items to have very high levels of 
reliability;  
g. in many cases, have limited performance 
data (that is, against FPS requirements) 
following installation into vehicles and 
                                                 
1 Requirement (para) 3.1.1 
2 An FPS defines a validated set of requirements for a 
capability system in terms of functions and needs without 
reference to a specific solution.  
3 A SCS can be defined as a ‘system whose failure could 
result in loss of life, significant property damage, or 
damage to the environment’ [14]. 
subsequent exposure to operating 
environments; and 
h. unlike most other items of mechanical or 
electronic equipment, cannot be tested at any 
point in time and, if found to be serviceable, 
reinstalled for a further period of service. 
Each of the above characteristics would, in 
isolation, provide logistics and engineering 
challenges for any asset management system. 
Collectively, these characteristics demand 
specialised asset management techniques to ensure 
the safe and effective operation of the inflators 
throughout their life. 
TECHNICAL INTEGRITY 
Technical integrity can be defined as an item’s: 
a. suitability for service, which is the item’s 
ability to satisfy the requirements of its FPS 
within a defined environment when operated 
or used as intended; 
b. design safety, which is freedom from those 
conditions during storage, transport and 
operation that can cause death, injury, or 
occupational illness; and 
c. compliance with regulations for 
environmental protection; that is, where the 
item poses no hazard to the environment [3]. 
Importantly, the status of an item’s technical 
integrity is the basis for deciding the item’s 
sustainability for, and confidence in, continued use.  
In confirming an item’s technical integrity, it is 
assumed that the item has been designed, 
constructed and maintained to approved standards 
by competent and authorised individuals (the 
manufacturer’s responsibility), who are acting as 
members of an approved organisation (the 
manufacturer’s organisation), and whose work is 
certified as correct and accepted on behalf of the 
operating organisation (in this case, the higher 
assembly vehicle OEM).  
To assure the technical integrity of any item there 
should be adequate provision by way of reviews 
and audits, to ensure the design intent is unimpaired 
in any way that could cause undue risk or harm to 
people or damage to the environment [4]. 
Additionally, Bale et al. (2010) quotes a BP 
document that states that the technical integrity will 
only be maintained by … the application of 
operational integrity assurance systems [4].  Rahim 
et al. (2010) recognise that the effective 
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management of technical integrity leads to reduced 
risk exposure [5].  
Technical Integrity Through-Life. To adequately 
reduce risk and ensure the required capability, the 
technical integrity of an item must be maintained 
throughout all phases of its defined life-cycle, 
which will include storage, transport, installation, 
operation and disposal. Consequently, in the case of 
inflators, the requirement is that the inflators are: 
a. safe to store and transport, 
b. safe to remain installed in a vehicle, and 
c. operate safely when required to the limits of 
their FPS, 
all within a defined environment, termed the 
Manufacturer to End Use Environment (MEUE). 
Additionally, inflators must be safe to be disposed 
of at the end of the life cycle. Consequently, any 
reviews and audits that are established need to 
confirm the technical integrity of an item within 
these bounds. 
CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT TO 
ASSURE TECHNICAL INTEGRITY 
Background. The requirement for the 
establishment and maintenance of technical 
integrity typically sits within an engineering and 
asset management system. Such systems commonly 
use configuration management (CM) as part of their 
approach to the establishment and maintenance of 
technical integrity. CM was developed and adopted 
within the aerospace industry and by the US 
Department of Defense in the late 1960s and 1970s, 
later resulting in a number of military specifications 
such as MIL-STD-972 (now superseded), and the 
current international industry standard ANSI/EIA-
649B [6]. ANSI/EIA-649B defines CM as ‘a 
management process for establishing and 
maintaining consistency of a product’s 
performance, functional, and physical attributes 
with its requirements, design and operational 
information throughout its life’. Rather than being 
aerospace or defence industry specific, this standard 
now provides a general industry view of CM by 
documenting and explaining its essential principles 
independent of specific industry practices [7]. 
Importantly, CM is now being recognised by some 
vehicle OEMs as an essential part of an engineering 
management system, particularly as they adopt a 
functional approach to systems engineering rather 
than a component based approach [8].  
Role of Configuration Management. CM can be 
seen as a technical discipline applied to manage the 
evolving design of items and, in general terms, can 
include items of equipment and associated 
software, support and test equipment, and 
documentation. It is also widely recognised that 
CM plays a vital part in a product’s life cycle to 
provide visibility and control on levels of 
performance and status [9]. Similarly, CM can have 
a central role in the establishment and maintenance 
of technical integrity of vehicle components 
including inflators. 
CM Activities. In general terms, CM is made up of 
four activities which involve: 
a. identifying and recording the physical and 
functional characteristics of items;  
b. controlling design changes to those items, 
usually within an engineering design change 
management system; 
c. recording the status of the configuration of 
those items, including the documentation 
and data that describes those items; and 
d. regularly auditing and verifying physical 
characteristics against design documents, 
and the functional performance of the item 
against its FPS, termed configuration 
verification and audit. 
More detailed descriptions of CM activities are 
available in dedicated CM publications, papers and 
standards [6] [10] [11].  
CONFIGURATION VERIFICATION AND 
AUDIT 
Assuming that the design, development and 
management of the design of inflators can occur, or 
is occurring, within a CM or CM-like environment, 
the ongoing maintenance of the technical integrity 
of the inflators can therefore, in part, be achieved 
by the regular audit of functional characteristics of 
the item against its FPS. This is achieved by the 
conduct of physical configuration audits (PCA) 
which, primarily, confirm the build standard of 
inventory items, and functional configuration audits 
(FCA), which confirm the safe and effective 
performance of inventory items against an FPS.  
To assure technical integrity, PCAs and FCAs are 
usually conducted as part of a larger multi-stage test 
and certification program over the item’s lifecycle. 
This larger program typically consists of: 
a. initial design certification activities. These 
test activities are designed to provide the 
initial assurance of technical integrity of the 
design prior to acceptance into service. That 
is, these design acceptance activities 
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demonstrate, via either evidence or 
argument, compliance with the requirements 
of the defined design certification basis; 
b. production acceptance testing, to ensure 
production items are representative of the 
design that was originally certified, and 
would typically include the same testing that 
is to be conducted through-life; 
c. through-life testing (FCA and PCA) to 
assure production items continue to meet 
ongoing technical integrity requirements 
over the item life defined in the FPS; and 
d. end of life assessment of technical integrity, 
to ensure the safety and environmental 
requirements for safe disposal are met. 
Initial design certification and production 
acceptance activities are currently conducted in 
accordance with USCAR24-2 [2] and are an 
integral part of establishing the technical integrity 
of inflators. 
PCA AND FCA FOR INFLATORS 
PCAs and FCAs for energetic items, such as 
inflators, can also be referred to as surveillance 
activities. These activities would include the 
ongoing testing and analysis of representative 
samples of inflators, in statistically significant 
quantities, that have experienced both the typical 
and more extreme operating environments. 
Importantly, these surveillance activities do not 
replicate initial design certification testing. Rather, 
this testing involves the measurement of selected 
performance parameters, termed Critical 
Performance Parameters (CPP), that are based on 
the requirements of the FPS. These CPPs should be 
measured at production acceptance and then at 
defined intervals during the lifecycle of the 
inflators.   
The selection of CPPs, quantity of items to be 
tested and frequency of testing needs to be carefully 
managed to ensure that the items tested are 
representative of the inventory and of the operating 
environments, and provide the required level of 
statistical confidence to support design and 
inventory management decisions. That is, the 
frequency of activities should be such that costs are 
minimised whilst being sufficiently frequent to 
enable trends in CPP performance to be recognised 
early. Consequently, the extent of the PCA/FCA 
surveillance activities to be conducted needs to be 
sufficient to provide the evidence and/or argument 
that is required to show ongoing compliance against 
the design requirements and FPS, though should be 
proportional to the risk to technical integrity posed 
by non-compliance.  
Irrespective, the program is likely to be of minimal 
cost compared to the potential costs of recall 
programs and/or litigation. 
Importantly, these surveillance activities, conducted 
within a CM framework, are consistent with the 
principles of ISO 55000:2014 Asset Management 
and ISO 31000:2009 Risk Management [12] [13]. 
PCA/FCA SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES 
A surveillance program for returned inflators4 that 
is cost effective and is likely to provide sufficient 
early warning of deviations from FPS requirements 
may consist of:  
a. visual inspection of test items, including 
checking for indications of potential 
malfunction, and may include inspections 
for general condition, evidence of corrosion 
and/or swelling of the inflator body; 
b. inflator performance test, though noting that 
a time-to-inflation test may be adequate in 
lieu of a full pressure-time test (noting the 
potentially higher cost of the latter); and 
c. structural integrity test (currently conducted 
in accordance with USCAR24-2 and as part 
of the performance test above). 
Depending on the results of these surveillance 
activities dedicated defect investigation programs, 
including subsequent additional testing, may be 
required. 
Quantities for Surveillance. Given the reduced 
numbers of parameters being measured in this 
surveillance program (and therefore reduced cost of 
testing) compared to the number of individual test 
activities required by the USCAR24-2 Design 
Verification (DV)/Production Validation (PV) test 
program, and the large number of items installed in 
vehicles and so available for testing, a surveillance 
program that tests a more than statistically 
significant quantity (that is, more than the 15 test 
items required by USCAR24-2 for DV/PV testing) 
could occur.  
Sampling for Surveillance. Sampling should 
consist of both probabilistic as well as non-
probabilistic sampling, the latter being useful to 
                                                 
4 These returned inflators, having already experienced the 
operating environment (or MEUE), would not be 
conditioned prior to testing.  
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identify, for example, fleet leaders in terms of both 
age and exposure to extreme environments. 
Specialist statistical advice on statistically 
significant sample sizes is typically available from 
within vehicle OEMs and/or regulators, noting the 
extant USCAR24-2 requirement for item reliability. 
Given the criticality of these items and the likely 
minimal cost of proposed surveillance testing, 
vehicle OEMs and/or regulators may wish to 
consider increasing the reliability and confidence 
limit requirements of USCAR24-2. 
Production Lot v. Design Based Lifing. The 
numbers of items required for testing will also 
depend on the basis that has been assumed for 
variations in performance due to production. That 
is, if there is significant performance differences 
between manufactured lots (identified during 
production acceptance test activities) then a 
surveillance strategy based on production lots, 
requiring testing of returned items from all 
production lots having experienced all 
environments, would be required. Alternatively, if 
there is an ongoing acceptably small variation in 
performance between production lots, and those 
variations are not likely to be exacerbated following 
natural ageing and exposure to the operating 
environment, then a design based approach to 
surveillance (that is, an assumption is made that all 
lots are homogeneous in performance against the 
FPS) will significantly reduce quantities required 
for testing. Irrespective, items selected for 
surveillance, in addition to samples from more 
benign operating environments, should include 
those that are more likely to have experienced 
environments that have been shown to generate 
failure modes (that is, thermal cycling, high 
humidity etc.). 
Other Surveillance Considerations. Given the 
design characteristics of these components (that is, 
single shot, energetic material, SCS etc.), there are 
a number of additional considerations when 
conducting these surveillance activities. These 
include: 
a. the type of statistical distribution appropriate 
for this data. In many cases the performance 
of energetic components has been assumed 
to follow a normal distribution. For these 
components consideration of a Weibull 
distribution for performance may be more 
appropriate; and 
b. the effect of censored data, and particularly 
left censored data, on trend analysis and 
reliability calculations. 
SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM SUMMARY 
The proposed approach for the through-life 
assurance of the technical integrity of inflators: 
a. has a sound engineering basis, being based 
on the requirements of a CM system; 
b. is cost effective, given that surveillance 
requires the testing of only a limited number 
of CPPs, reducing program costs; 
c. ensures the testing of items that have 
experienced more extreme environments 
considered to be major causes for item 
failure; 
d. is in constant operation, allowing trends in 
performance to be identified with the 
subsequent timely implementation of 
appropriate risk mitigation strategies; and 
e. is likely to identify changes in safe operation 
and/or performance of inflators due to: 
(1) changes in configuration, perhaps 
caused by a sub-contractor making 
changes to production processes 
and/or materials;  
(2) changes in operating environments; 
(3) changes in maintenance policies 
(such as the requirement to replace 
airbags more frequently in some 
jurisdictions); and 
(4) the acceptance of production permits5 
and/or deviations6 by the item OEM 
or OEM sub-contractors. 
The data generated by the surveillance can be used 
to: 
a. quantify the effect of environments on the 
design of inflators, 
                                                 
5 A production permit can be defined as a variation from 
item specification or configuration agreed to before 
production and, within a CM system, results in an item 
termed the Build Standard (that is, a Product Baseline 
plus an approved Engineering Change Proposal (ECP)).  
6 A production deviation can be defined as a variation 
from item specification or configuration agreed to after 
production and, within a CM system, results in an item 
termed the Approved Build State (that is, the Build 
Standard plus an approved Request For Variation (RFV)). 
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b. quantify the design reliability of inflators at 
any stage of their design life to statistically 
acceptable levels,  
c. estimate the remaining useful life of 
installed airbags given an intended or known 
environmental exposure profile, 
d. mitigate the risk associated with expensive 
vehicle component recalls, and 
e. assure the through-life technical integrity of 
inflators and, consequently, public safety. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper presents a strategy for the ongoing 
assurance of the technical integrity of impact bag 
inflators. The results of the surveillance program 
provide assurance to manufacturers, higher 
assembly vehicle manufacturers and regulating 
authorities that inflators remain safe to store, 
transport, and remain installed in that vehicle safety 
critical system, and still operate when required to 
the limits of their Function and Performance 
Specification (FPS). This surveillance program has 
its basis in CM, which provides a sound 
engineering framework for determining the safety 
status and performance of inflators. The program 
mitigates many of the asset management risks, is 
cost effective, easily targeted at inflators that have 
experienced more extreme environments and, as a 
continuous operation, provides ongoing confidence 
in the safety and performance of inflators.  
Acronyms 
CM Configuration Management 
CPP Critical Performance Parameter 
FPS Function and Performance Specification 
MEUE Manufacturer to End Use Environment 
OEM  Original Equipment Manufacturer 
SCS Safety Critical System 
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